InfoSec
3 articles about "InfoSec".
The Scanner Had the Bug It Was Looking For: Auditing Someone Else's Invisible-Character List, Then Our Own
Anthropic's commerce-agents blueprint strips invisible characters with a hand-written list. A Unicode category sweep found 34 Cf code points and four invisible non-Cf characters missing from it, enough to keep a fence label or a role word intact through sanitizing. Then we pointed the same probe at our own code and all three of our scanners missed the same set. On why enumerations expire, how to grade a finding honestly, and how binding rules to wording instead of concepts makes you systematically underrate the systems that got it right.
Why Agentic AI Attack Testing Shouldn't Be One Class Per Attack: The Vector / Framing / Scorer Decomposition
In an agent pipeline the same malicious payload can enter as a tool result, a retrieved document, or a sub-agent message. Write one attack class per entry point and your test harness explodes. This is the three-axis model we posted publicly in microsoft/PyRIT: injection vector is data, framing is a transform, the scorer is the verdict, and why an attack is a placement, not a message.
Prompt Injection Isn't Your Biggest Risk: We Scanned 500 AI Apps and Found 11 Undefended Attack Vectors
Everyone talks about Prompt Injection, but it's just 1 of 12 LLM attack vectors. We scanned 500+ AI system prompts with UltraProbe and found 83% only defend against the most obvious one. Here are the other 11 you're ignoring.